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Abstract
We consider the problem of zero-shot coordina-
tion - constructing AI agents that can coordinate
with novel partners they have not seen before (e.g.
humans). Standard Multi-Agent Reinforcement
Learning (MARL) methods typically focus on
the self-play (SP) setting where agents construct
strategies by playing the game with themselves
repeatedly. Unfortunately, applying SP naively to
the zero-shot coordination problem can produce
agents that establish highly specialized conven-
tions that do not carry over to novel partners they
have not been trained with. We introduce a novel
learning algorithm called other-play (OP), that
enhances self-play by looking for more robust
strategies, exploiting the presence of known sym-
metries in the underlying problem. We character-
ize OP theoretically as well as experimentally. We
study the cooperative card game Hanabi and show
that OP agents achieve higher scores when paired
with independently trained agents. In preliminary
results we also show that our OP agents obtains
higher average scores when paired with human
players, compared to state-of-the-art SP agents.
1. Introduction
A central challenge for AI is constructing agents that can
coordinate and cooperate with partners they have not seen
before (Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2016; Lerer & Peysakhovich,
2017; Carroll et al., 2019; Shum et al., 2019). This is partic-
ularly important in applications such as cooperative game
playing, communication, or autonomous driving (Foerster
et al., 2016; Lazaridou et al., 2016; Sukhbaatar et al., 2016;
Resnick et al., 2018). In this paper we consider the question
of zero-shot coordination where agents are placed into a
cooperative situation with a novel partner and must quickly
coordinate if they wish to earn high payoffs.
Our setting is a partially observed cooperative Markov game
*Equal contribution 1Facebook AI Research, USA. Correspon-
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(MG) which is commonly known among both agents. The
agents are able to construct strategies separately in the train-
ing phase but cannot coordinate on the strategies that they
construct. They must then play these strategies when paired
together one time. We refer to this as zero-shot coordination.
A popular way of constructing strategies for MG with un-
known opponents is self-play (or “self-training”), (Tesauro,
1994). Here the agent controls both players during train-
ing and iteratively improves both players’ strategies. The
agent then uses this strategy at test time. If it converges,
self-play finds a Nash equilibrium of the game and yields
superhuman AI agents in two-player zero-sum games such
as Chess, Go and Poker (Campbell et al., 2002; Silver et al.,
2017; Brown & Sandholm, 2018). However, in complex
environments self-play agents typically construct ‘inhuman’
strategies (Carroll et al., 2019). This may be a benefit for
zero-sum games, but is less useful when it is important to
coordinate with, not trick, one’s partner.
Our main contribution is “other-play” (OP), an algorithm for
constructing good strategies for the zero-shot coordination
setting. We assume that with every MG we are provided
with a set of symmetries, i.e. arbitrary relabelings of the
state/action space that leave trajectories unchanged up to
relabeling. One source of miscoordination in zero-shot
settings is that agents have no good way to break the sym-
metries (e.g. should we drive on the left or the right?). In
most MDPs, there are classes of strategies that require more
or less coordinated symmetry breaking. OP’s goal is to
find a strategy that is maximally robust to partners breaking
symmetries in different ways while still playing in the same
class. OP works as follows: it uses RL to maximize reward
when matched with agents playing the same policy under
a random relabeling of states and actions under the known
symmetries.
To show the intuition behind OP consider the following
game: you need to coordinate with an unknown stranger
by independently choosing one from a set of 10 different
levers (Figure 1a). If both of you pick the same lever a
reward of 1 point is paid out, otherwise you leave the game
empty-handed. Clearly, without any prior coordination the
only option is to pick one of the levers at random, leading
to an expected reward of 1/10 = 0.1.
Next we consider a game that instead only pays 0.9 for one
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Figure 1. The lever coordination game illustrates the counter intu-
itive outcome of zero-shot coordination.
of the levers, keeping all other levers unchanged (Figure 1b).
How does this change the coordination problem?
From the point of view of the MG the 1 payoff levers have no
labels and so are symmetric. Since agents cannot coordinate
on how to break symmetries, picking one of the 1.0 levers
leads to 0.11 expected return. By contrast, OP suggests the
choice of the 0.9 lever.
We note that this example illustrates another facet of OP: it
is an equilibrium in meta-strategies. That is, neither agent
wishes to deviate from OP as a reasoning strategy if the
other agent is using it.
Note that OP does not use any action labels. Instead OP uses
only features of the problem description to coordinate. Fur-
thermore, note that the OP policy in this setting is the only
policy that would never be chosen by the types of algorithms
that try to use self-play to optimize team performance, e.g.
VDN (Sunehag et al., 2018) or SAD (Hu & Foerster, 2019).
The main contributions of this work are: 1) we introduce
OP as a way of solving the zero-shot coordination problem,
2) we show that OP is the highest payoff meta-equilibrium
for the zero-shot coordination problem, 3) we show how to
implement OP using deep reinforcement learning (deep RL)
based methods, and 4) we evaluate OP in the cooperative
card game Hanabi (Bard et al., 2020).
2. Related Work
2.1. Self-Play in Cooperative Settings
There is a large body of research on constructing agents to
do well in positive-sum games. Self-play, if it converges,
converges to an equilibrium of the game and so in purely co-
operative games SP agents will be able to coordinate. Here
the main problem is that SP may reach inefficient equilib-
ria and so there is a large literature on pushing self-play
toward higher payoff equilibria using various algorithmic
innovations (Babes et al., 2008; Devlin et al., 2011; Devlin
& Kudenko, 2016; Peysakhovich & Lerer, 2018). However,
the setting where agents play with the same agents they
have been trained with (aka. centralized training with de-
centralized execution) is quite different from the zero-shot
coordination one which we study.
2.2. Cooperation and Coordination
A closely related problem to zero-shot coordination is ad-
hoc teamwork (Stone et al., 2010; Barrett et al., 2011). For
example: a robot agent joining another existing group of
agents to play soccer (Barrett et al., 2011). Ad-hoc team-
work differs from the zero-shot coordination problem in
that it is typically framed as a learning problem of learning
the policies/capabilities of other agents during interaction
whereas the pure zero-shot coordination scenario is one
where there is no time to update a fixed policy that is con-
structed during training. These problems are closely linked
and incorporating ideas from this literature into algorithms
like OP is an interesting question for future research. How-
ever, another difference is that zero-shot agents only need to
coordinate well with teams of agents that are optimized for
the zero-shot setting, rather than arbitrary teams self-play
of agents.
There is recent work looking at the situation where the one
RL agent, trained separately, must join a group of new AI
agents or humans (Lerer & Peysakhovich, 2018; Tucker
et al., 2020; Carroll et al., 2019). These papers focus on
using small amounts of observed behavior from partnered
test time agents to either guide self-play to selecting the
equilibrium (or “social convention”) of the existing agents
(Lerer & Peysakhovich, 2018; Tucker et al., 2020) or allow
building a human model which can be used to learn an
approximate best response using RL (Carroll et al., 2019).
This setting is related, but zero-shot coordination gives no
behavioral data to either agent to guide self-play or allow
building a model of the other agent. Instead, zero-shot
makes the assumption that test-time agents being themselves
are optimized for the zero-shot setting (rather than the SP
setting).
2.3. Game Theory and Tacit Coordination
Within behavorial game theory a large body of work con-
siders coordination based on “focal points” or other shared
grounding such as the famous “you lost your friend in New
York City, where are you going to meet?” coordination
problem (Schelling, 1980; Mehta et al., 1994). However,
such focal points typically come from the fact that these
coordination problems are not just abstract but grounded in
exogenous features, action labels, that are meaningful due
to a prior shared context. The zero-shot coordination set-
ting thus is a special form of the tacit coordination problem
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in which there are no shared exogenous features between
the different agents and OP can be thought of as a way to
coordinate in this setting.
There is also a large theoretical literature on learning and
evolving coordination (Nowak, 2006). However, as with
the self-play literature, it focuses on long run outcomes
within a single group of agents learning or evolving together
and does not typically focus on the question of engineering
agents as we do.
2.4. Predicting Human Decision Making
Clearly, if we were able to accurately predict how our hu-
man counterparts are going to act in any given situation,
the zero-shot coordination with human counterparts would
reduce to learning a best response to those predicted ac-
tions. There is a large body of work using formal models to
predict and understand human decision making (Camerer,
2011) and recent work that incorporates machine learning
into this question (Wright & Leyton-Brown, 2010; Hartford
et al., 2016; Peysakhovich & Naecker, 2017; Kleinberg et al.,
2017; Fudenberg & Liang, 2019). However, the majority of
this research focuses on extremely simple settings such as
small normal form games (Wright & Leyton-Brown, 2010;
Hartford et al., 2016; Fudenberg & Liang, 2019) or single
decision problems (Peysakhovich & Naecker, 2017; Klein-
berg et al., 2017) rather than complex cooperative settings
with partial observability.
2.5. Domain Randomization
Our work is also related to the idea of domain randomization
(Tobin et al., 2017). In RL and supervised learning domain
randomization tries to make the realized model invariant to
some feature of the environment. For example, an object
detector should be invariant to the exact camera angle from
which a view of an object is captured. OP applies a similar
idea: a policy should be invariant to how an agent’s partner
breaks symmetries in the underlying game.
2.6. Exploiting Symmetries in Other Contexts
In the single agent context, it is harder to plan in MDPs
that have more states. The idea of abstraction is to use
underlying symmetries to ‘compress’ a large MDP into a
simpler one, solve for the optimal strategy in the abstrac-
tion, and then lift the strategy to the original MDP. One set
of such methods are MDP homomorphisms (van der Pol
et al., 2020; Ravindran & Barto, 2004). These, like OP, use
underlying symmetries but their goal is different: they want
to find payoff maximizing policies for single agent decision
problems, while OP seeks to find robust policies for zero-
shot coordination. Note that as the lever game illustrates
robust policies are not necessarily the payoff maximizing
ones. In addition, these methods do not solve the problem of
equilibrium selection among ‘symmetric’ policies in games,
because the symmetry in the MDP just becomes a symmetry
in the homomorphism.
A similar technique (compress, solve, then lift) is also used
for finding Nash equilibria in large games like poker (Gilpin
& Sandholm, 2007). In this case the abstraction treats ‘iso-
morphic’ states equally and thus reduces the effective num-
ber of states in the game. Again, the goal is different - poker
abstractions are trying to find Nash equilibrium strategies
in the original game while OP uses symmetries to select
among a set of possible equilibria.
3. Zero-Shot Coordination
In this paper we study fully cooperative Markov games.
To construct this environment we start out with a Dec-
POMDP (Nair et al., 2003) with states st ∈ S. There
are i = 1, · · ·N agents who each choose actions, ait ∈ A at
each time step.
The game is partially observable, oit ∼ O(o|i, st) being each
agent’s stochastic observation function. At time t each agent
has an action-observation history τ it = {oi0, ai0, ri0, · · · , oit}
and selects action ati using stochastic policies of the form
piiθ(a
i|τ it ). The transition function, P (s′|s,a), conditions
on the joint action, a.
The game is fully cooperative, agents share the reward rt
which is conditioned on the joint action and the state. Thus,
the goal is to maximize the expected return J = EτR(τ),
where R(τ) =
∑
t γ
trt is calculated using the discount
factor γ.
Most work on cooperative MARL focuses on a setting where
agents are trained together, although they must execute their
policies independently at least at test time , e.g. (Lowe
et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2018a;b). The goal is to con-
struct learning rules, i.e. functions that map Markov games
to (joint) policies that select policies for each agent that
together maximize expected discounted return. Because
agents are trained together, these policies may be arbitrarily
complex.
We are instead interested in achieving high returns with part-
ners that were not trained together with our agent. Instead,
we will frame the problem as follows: suppose that multiple
independent AI designers will construct agents that have to
interact in various but ex-ante unknown Dec-POMDPs with-
out being able to coordinate beforehand, what learning rule
should these designers agree on? To make this even more
concrete, consider the case of independent autonomous vehi-
cles made by multiple firms which have to interact in novel
traffic situations on a daily basis.
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Figure 2.
The first key concept
we introduce is the class
of equivalence mappings,
Φ, for a given Dec-
POMDP.
Each element of Φ is a bi-
jection of each of S, O,
and A onto itself, such
that it leaves the Dec-
POMDP unchanged:
φ ∈ Φ ⇐⇒ P (φ(s′)|φ(s), φ(a)) = P (s′|s, a)
∧R(φ(s′), φ(a), φ(s)) = R(s′, a, s)
∧O(φ(o)|φ(s), φ(a), i) = O(o|s, a, i)
where equalities apply ∀s′, s, a′
In other words, Φ describes the symmetries in the under-
lying Dec-POMDP. We note that our notation is heavily
overloaded since each φ can act on actions, states and the ob-
servation function, so φ shorthand for φ = {φS , φA, φO}.
Next, we extend φ to also act on trajectories:
φ(τ it ) = {φ(oi0), φ(ai0), φ(r0), · · · , φ(oit)}.
At this point an example might be helpful: consider a grid-
world with a robot, shown in Figure 2, that can move in
the 4 cardinal directions. In our example the goal is in the
middle of the room, which leaves two axis of symmetry:
We can invert either the x-axis, the y-axis or both, as long
as we make the corresponding changes to the action space,
for example mapping “up” to “down” and vice versa when
inverting the y-axis.
In a similar way, we can extend φ to act on policies pi, as
follows:
pi′ = φ(pi) ⇐⇒ pi′(φ(a)|φ(τ)) = pi(a|τ),∀τ, a
These symmetries are the “payoff irrelevant” parts of the
Dec-POMDP. They come from the fact that the actions and
states in the Dec-POMDP do not come with labels and
so taking a policy and permuting it with respect to these
symmetries does not change the outcome of interest: the
trajectory and the reward.
It is precisely these symmetries that can cause problems for
self-play trained agents. Since agents are trained together,
they can coordinate on how to break symmetries. How-
ever, there is no guarantee that multiple SP agents trained
separately will break symmetries in the same way. In this
case when they are paired together their policies may fail
spectacularly.
The goal of OP, then, will be to build policies which are
maximally robust to this failure mode.
4. Other Play
We consider the 2 agent case for ease of notation with pi1, pi2
denoting each agent’s component of the policy and pi denot-
ing the joint policy.
First, consider self-play (SP) learning rule. This is the
learning rule which tries to optimize the following objective:
pi∗ = arg max
pi
J(pi1, pi2) (1)
When the Dec-POMDP is tabular we can solve this via
various methods. When it is not, deep reinforcement learn-
ing (deep RL) can be used to apply function approxima-
tion and gradient based optimization of this objective func-
tion. Though there is a large literature focusing on various
issues in multi-agent optimization (Busoniu et al., 2006;
Hernandez-Leal et al., 2019), our paper is agnostic to the
precise method used.
These policies can be arbitrary and in complicated Dec-
POMDPs multiple maxima to Equation 1 will often exist.
These multiple policies can (and, as we will see in our
experiments, often will) use coordinated symmetry breaking
to receive high payoffs. Therefore, 2 matched, separately
trained, SP agents will not necessarily receive the same
payoff with each other as they receive with themselves.
To alleviate this issue, we need to make the optimization
problem more robust to the symmetry breaking.
Let us consider the point of view of constructing a strat-
egy for agent 1 where agent 2 will be the unknown novel
partner. The other-play (OP) objective function for agent 1
maximizes expected return when randomly matched with
a symmetry-equivalent policy of agent 2 rather than with a
particular one. In other words, we perform a version of self-
play where agents are not assumed to be able to coordinate
on exactly how to break symmetries.
pi∗ = arg max
pi
Eφ∼Φ J(pi1, φ(pi2)) (2)
Here the expectation is taken with respect to a uniform
distribution on Φ. We call this expected return JOP . We
will now consider what policies maximize JOP .
Lemma 1.
J(piA, piB) = J(φ(pi
1
A), φ(pi
2
B)), ∀φ ∈ Φ, piA, piB
This Lemma follows directly from the fact that the MDP is
invariant to any φ ∈ Φ.
Lemma 2.
{φ · φ′ : φ′ ∈ Φ} = Φ , ∀φ ∈ Φ
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This Lemma follows from the fact that Φ is a bijection.
Proposition 1. The expected OP return of pi is equal to
the expected return of each player independently playing
a policy piiΦ which is the uniform mixture of φ(pi
i) for all
φ ∈ Φ.
Proof.
JOP (pi) = Eφ∼Φ J(pi1, φ(pi2)) (3)
= Eφ1∼Φ,φ2∼Φ J(φ1(pi
1), φ1(φ2(pi
2))) (4)
= Eφ1∼Φ,φ2∼Φ J(φ1(pi
1), φ2(pi
2)) (5)
= J(piΦ) (6)
(4) follows from Lemma 1, (5) follows from Lemma 2.
Corollary 1. The distribution pi∗OP produced by OP will be
the uniform mixture piΦ with the highest return J(piΦ).
Let Li be the set of learning rules which input a Dec-
POMDP and output a policy for agent i.
A meta-equilibrium is a learning rule for each agent such
that neither agent can improve their expected payoff by
unilaterally deviating to a different learning rule.
Proposition 2. If agent i uses OP as their learning rule
then OP is a payoff maximizing learning rule for the agent’s
partner. Furthermore both agents using OP is the best
possible meta-equilibrium.
Proof. Since the Dec-POMDP has no labels for actions
and states, Li must choose all φ(pi) with equal probability.
Among these possible outputs, pi∗OP maximizes the return
by Corollary 1.
5. Implementing Other Play via Deep RL
We now turn to optimizing the OP objective function. In
many applications of interest the Dec-POMDP is not tabular.
Thus, deep RL algorithms use function approximation for
the state space and attempt to find local maxima of Equation
1 using self-play reinforcement learning.
We show how to adapt this method to optimize the other-
play objective (Equation 2). This amounts to applying a very
specific kind of asymmetric domain randomization (Tobin
et al., 2017) during training.
During each episode of MARL training, for each agent i a
random permutation φi ∈ Φ is chosen uniformly iid from
Φ, and agent i observes and acts on φ(S, O,A). Impor-
tantly, the agents act in different permutations of the same
environment.
This environment randomization is equivalent to other-play,
because the MDP remains constant under φi while the effect
of agent i’s policy on the environment is φi(pii). The fixed
points of independent optimization of pi under this learning
rule will be joint policies where each pii is a BR to the
uniform mixture of permutations of partner policies, i.e.
precisely the permutation-invariant equilibria that are the
solutions of other-play.
We note that OP is fundamentally compatible with any type
of optimization strategy and can be applied whenever there
are symmetries in the underlying MDP.
6. Experiments
We evaluate OP in two different settings. In each setting
we will compare standard SP against OP. We will perform
comparisons of agents trained together to agents trained
separately that are placed into a zero-shot coordination test
game.
6.1. Lever Game
We begin with the “lever game” mentioned in the introduc-
tion. This environment is tabular, there are only 10 actions
possible per player. Here, during training, we use simple
joint action learning, compute the true gradient with respect
to the current policy and update. We show training time
(i.e. expected reward with itself) and test time (zero-shot)
coordination performance for both SP (optimizing equation
1) and OP (optimizing equation 2). The code is available as
a notebook online here and can be executed online without
downloading: https://bit.ly/2vYkfI7.
Figure 3 shows the results. As expected, OP agents coor-
dinate on the unique option of 0.9 points both during the
training phase and at test time. As a consequence, OP agents
can carry out successful zero-shot coordination when paired
with other OP agents.
In contrast, SP agents achieve higher rewards of 1.0 points
during the training phase but entirely fail to coordinate with
other, independently trained, SP agents.
6.2. Hanabi with AI Agents
We now turn to a much more complex environment. We con-
struct agents for the cooperative card game Hanabi, which
has recently been established a benchmark environment for
multi-agent decision making in partially observable settings
(Bard et al., 2020).
Hanabi is a cooperative card game with the interesting twist
that players cannot see their own cards and hence have to
rely on receiving information from the other player (who
can see their hand). In Hanabi, there are two main ways
of exchanging information: first of all, players can take
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Figure 3. Train and test performance of self-play and other-play
algorithms on the lever coordination game. Shown is the mean,
shading is the standard error of the mean (s.e.m.), across 30 differ-
ent seeds.
costly “hint” actions that point out subsets of cards based
on rank or color. For example, hinting for “blue” reveals
the color of all blue cards. Secondly, observing the actions
themselves can be informative, in particular when players
have pre-established conventions. The goal in Hanabi is
to play cards in a legal order completing stacks of cards,
one for each color. There are 5 color and 5 cards and the
maximum points is 25. Players will lost a life token if they
play a card out of order. Once they exhaust the deck or lose
all 3 lives (“bomb out”), the game will terminate.
As noted, the vast majority of research on Hanabi has been
in the self-play setting, in which a group of agents is trained
to jointly obtain the highest possible score. To apply OP in
Hanabi we note that assuming no side information, a permu-
tation of the colors of the cards leaves the game unchanged.
We use this as our class of symmetries.
6.3. MARL Training Details
OP can be applied on top of any SP algorithm. In Hanabi the
Simplified Action Decoder (SAD) (Hu & Foerster, 2019)
method achieves SOTA performance for RL agents. We
use SAD as a base algorithm onto which we add OP. We
use the open-sourced implementation of SAD as well as
most of its hyper-parameters but with two major modifica-
tions. First, we use 2 GPUs for simulation instead of 1 as in
the original paper. This doubles the data generation speed
and has a profound effect on reducing the wall clock time
required to achieve competitive performance. Second, we
introduce extra hyper-parameters that control the network
architecture to add diversity to the model capacity in order
to better demonstrate the effectiveness of OP. Specifically,
the network can have either 1 or 2 fully connected layers
before 2 LSTM layers and can have an optional residual
connection to by-pass the LSTM layers. For SP, we re-train
the base SAD and the SAD + AUX variant proposed in Hu
& Foerster (2019). SAD + AUX is specifically engineered
for Hanabi by adding an auxiliary task to predict whether a
card is playable, discardable, or unknown. We train agents
with the aforementioned 4 different network architectures.
We run each hyper-parameter configuration with 3 different
seeds and thus 12 models are produced for each category of
{SAD, SAD + AUX, SAD + OP, SAD + AUX + OP}.
6.4. Evaluation
We evaluate the models within the same category by pairing
different models together to play the game, a process we
refer to as cross-play. Clearly, if independent training runs
(“seeds”) from the same training method fail to coordinate
with each other at test time it is unlikely they will coordinate
with agents optimized by through a different process, let
alone humans. As such, cross-play is a cheap proxy to eval-
uate whether a training method has potential for zero-shot
coordination with human players. Figure 4 shows the scores
obtained between all pairs of agents. Table 1 shows the
average within-pair and cross-play scores. We see that SAD
coordinates with itself but fails to coordinate with any other
SAD agent. SAD with OP, however, significantly improves
the cross-play. The effect is especially profound when the
model has limited representation power. The top left cor-
ner of the graph, which corresponds to the simplest models
that have only 1 fully connected layers, 2 LSTM layers and
no residual connection, shows almost perfect cooperation
scores. With the network growing more complicated, differ-
ent strategies start to emerge and the cross-play performance
drops. Auxiliary task implicitly improves cross-play scores
by encouraging all agents to act basing on grounded infor-
mation and confident predictions. Nonetheless, adding OP
to SAD + AUX further improves performance and achieves
the highest cross-play payoffs.
We can further study the policies resulting from these learn-
ing algorithms. Figure 5 picks the agent with highest
cross-play performance in each category (top row) as well
as their worst possible partner (bottom row) and presents
P (ait | ajt−1) over a subset of actions averaged over time-
steps in 1000 episodes generated through self-play. In other
words, we ask, do the agents respond very differently to
possible actions of their partner? A large difference indi-
cates that what an agent would do in a situation is very
different from what their partner would do: a recipe for
miscoordination!
We see that two paired SAD agents have very different poli-
cies and thus miscoordinate a lot. They also learn “inhuman”
conventions that are hard for human to understand. For ex-
ample, the agent hints Color5 to indicate discarding the 1st
card while its partner interprets that as playing the 2nd card.
OP eliminates these type of conventions. From the plot and
our experience of playing with the SAD + OP agent, we
find that it tends to use color hints to indicate either that
the partner should save the card, or to disambiguate with a
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Figure 4. Cross-Play Matrix. Visualization of paired evaluation of different agents trained under the same method. y-axis represents the
agent index of player 1 (first mover) and x-axis represents that of player 2. Agents 0-2: 1-layer FC, without residual connection; Agents
3-5: 1-layer FC, with residual connection; Agents 6-8: 2-layer FC, without residual connection; Agents 9-11: 2-layer FC, with residual
connection. All agents have 2-layer LSTMs after the FC layers. Each block in the grid is obtained by evaluating the pair on 10K games
with different seeds. Please refer to Table 1 for numeric results.
Method Cross-Play Cross-Play(*) Self-Play
SAD 2.52 ± 0.34 3.02 ± 0.39 23.97 ± 0.04
SAD + OP 15.32 ± 0.65 18.28 ± 0.36 23.93 ± 0.02
SAD + AUX 17.65 ± 0.69 21.09 ± 0.18 24.09 ± 0.03
SAD + AUX + OP 22.07 ± 0.11 22.49 ± 0.18 24.06 ± 0.02
Table 1. Cross-Play Performance. The average performance of pairs of agents that are train with the same method but different network
architecture and/or seeds. Please refer to Figure 4 for visualization of performance for each individual pair. Cross-Play score is non-
diagonal mean of each grid. Cross-Play(*) is the cross-play score after removing the worst model from the grid. Self-Play score is the
score attained when agents play with the partner they are trained with.
subsequent rank hint. This is not a typical strategy played
by seasoned human players but is easy understand and thus
makes the agent easier to cooperate with. However, due to
the way we implement OP in Hanabi, it is still possible to
form secretive conventions such as using all color hints to
indicate a specific move. For example, the worst partner of
SAD + OP uses all color hints to indicate playing the 5th
card.
6.5. Hanabi with Humans
So far we have focused on AI agents that play other AI
agents and have shown that OP is a meta-equilibrium with
respect to learning rules in the zero-shot setting.
We now ask: do human strategies in Hanabi also have an
OP-like quality? In other words, do OP agents perform well
with humans?
To begin to answer this question we recruited 20 individuals
from a board game club. These individuals were familiar
with Hanabi but not expert players. We asked each individ-
ual to play a game of Hanabi with two bots, in random order,
using the user interface open-sourced by (Lerer et al., 2019).
We note that we did not provide the participants with any
information about the bots, either regarding their strategy or
the method through which they were trained.
For testing we selected our best SAD + AUX + OP agent
based on the cross-play performance (henceforth OP bot).
We also have individuals play with the SOTA self-play agent
from (Hu & Foerster, 2019) (henceforth SP bot). We down-
load models from their GitHub repo and pick the model
based on cross-play scores. For reference, the SP model
used here gets 23.99 in self-play and 20.99 in cross-play
with other agents where the only difference among them is
seed.
Since in Hanabi the exact deck being used can make a huge
difference (for example, some hands are unwinnable), to
reduce the variance of our results we play each seed by two
different players, one for our OP agent, and one for the
control. Importantly, to prevent any adaptation advantages,
we alternate the order between which bot came first across
different participants.
Humans achieved an average score of 15.75 (s.e.m. 1.23)
with the OP bot and “bombed out” 45% of games. Thus
the OP bot, which has high cross-play scores with other OP
bots is also able to play with humans. Note, in our counting
convention players keep the current score when the bomb
out, which be believe is more appropriate for the zero-shot
setting.
By comparison, humans paired with the SP bot achieve
an average score of 9.15 (s.e.m. 1.18) and an 85% bomb
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Figure 5. P (ait | ajt−1) Matrices. Each subplot can be used as a proxy to roughly decipher conventions of an agent. The y-axis means the
action taken at time-step t and x-axis means the percentage of each action as response at time-step t+ 1. Here we only show a quarter
of the matrix that corresponds to the interaction between color/rank hint and play/discard positions. C1-C5 and R1-R5 mean hinting 5
different colors and ranks respectively while D1-D5 and P1-P5 mean discarding and playing 1st-5th cards of the hand. For each plot, we
take an agent and run 1000 episodes of self-play to compute statistics. The agents that achieved the highest cross-play scores in Figure 4
are used to generate the top row and their worst partners are chosen to render the bottom row.
rate. To the best of our knowledge, the only other research
involving human-AI collaboration in Hanabi is (Eger et al.,
2017). Here, a hand-coded AI agent, designed to play well
with humans is used and achieves an average of around 15.0
points when paired with humans. Beyond the average scores
and “bomb-out” rates, we thus also have access to pairwise
comparisons for the two bots when playing two different
people on the same deck.
Figure 6. Shown are all scores obtained by human testing. Each
blue dot is one seed, when humans are matched with the SP bot
(x-axis) and the OP bot (y-axis).
These preliminary numbers confirm that our OP bot signif-
icantly outperformed the SOTA self-play bot from (Hu &
Foerster, 2019) when paired with humans. In particular, OP
won 15 out of the 20 per-seed comparisons and tied in 2
cases, losing to the control group for 3 seeds (p=0.0041).
Of course, these results do not suggest that OP will work
in every zero-shot coordination where AI agents need to
cooperate with humans. However, they are encouraging
and suggest that OP is a fruitful research direction for the
important problem of human-AI coordination.
7. Other Attempts
While attempting to make progress on the zero-shot coordi-
nation problem in Hanabi we tried a variety of approaches.
Here we discuss some other approaches that seemed promis-
ing but did not yield agents that were able to coordinate
with agents they were not trained with. While this does not
necessarily mean these approaches are doomed to failure,
we report these results as information for other researchers
interested in this problem.
In particular we tried multi-agent RL adaptations of cog-
nitive hierarchies (Stahl, 1993), k-level reasoning (Costa-
Gomes et al., 2001) and training a population of agents.
Our original inspiration was that both cognitive hierarchies
and k-level reasoning should reduce the tendency towards
arbitrary symmetry breaking and have been shown to pro-
1exact binomial test of the null hypothesis being that P(OP
higher score) ≤ P(control higher score).
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duce human like decision making in other settings (Wright
& Leyton-Brown, 2010). Similarly, population based ap-
proaches are gaining popularity for regularizing communi-
cation protocols in the field of emergent communication,
see e.g. (Fitzgerald, 2019; Tieleman et al., 2018; Lowe
et al., 2019). We found that none of these approaches pro-
duced high cross-play performance in Hanabi, which we
now consider a necessary condition for high zero-shot per-
formance with humans. In hind-sight, considering that all of
these approaches would necessarily fail in the matrix game
example, this is not at all surprising. Still, to help future
researchers learn from our endeavours, we are adding all
results to the supplementary material and will open-source
the corresponding agents.
8. Conclusion
We have shown that a simple expansion of self-play which
we call other-play can construct agents that are better able to
zero-shot coordinate with partners they have not seen before.
We have proven theoretical properties of the OP strategy,
shown how to implement it with deep RL, and shown in
experiments with the cooperative card game Hanabi that OP
can construct robust agents that can play with other AIs as
well as with humans.
We do not claim that OP is a silver bullet for all zero-shot
coordination problems. In particular, because OP is a modi-
fication of the SP algorithm, it can be combined with many
of the algorithmic innovations that have been developed to
improve SP in various games (Lanctot et al., 2017; Foerster
et al., 2018a; Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2017). Thus,
we believe that this represents an exciting research direction
for those interested in moving deep RL beyond two-player,
zero-sum environments to ones involving coordination and
cooperation. Currently we are assuming that the symmetries
Φ are given to the algorithm. However, in principle, discov-
ering the symmetries of an MDP is another optimization
problem, which opens interesting avenues for future work.
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A. Details on Other Attempts
k Cross-Play Self-Play
1 1.06 ± 0.04 1.04 ± 0.06
2 0.95 ± 0.18 0.99 ± 0.33
3 1.49 ± 0.11 2.63 ± 0.34
4 2.48 ± 0.22 5.89 ± 0.75
5 2.04 ± 0.35 7.22 ± 0.56
Table 2. Cognitive Hierarchies Performance. We train CH for 5
levels with 3 seeds. The cross-play and self-play results are com-
puted by averaging scores of intra-level pairing of agents trained
with different seeds. Cross-play score is averaged over 6 pairs and
self-play score is averaged over 3 pairs for each cell.
In this section we provide more details on other attempts
mentioned previously.
The core idea behind cognitive hierarchies (CH) (Stahl,
1993) and k-level reasoning (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001)
is to train a sequence of K agents of different capabilities.
The final agents may hopefully learn strategies that cross-
play well through such explicit route of evolution. In our
implementation of CH, the first agent a(0) in the sequence
is a random agent that pick actions uniformly regardless of
the state. The kth agent a(k) is trained to be the “best re-
sponse” to the pool of agents {a(0), ..., a(k−1)}. Intuitively,
this means that the first agent will learn to play based only
on the hinted facts, i.e. ground information, to play Hanabi
because a(0)’s actions contain no intentions nor conventions.
a(2) can then learn to give more useful hints and the sub-
sequent agents may learn more complicated behaviors. In
k-level, the kth agent a(k) only learns to best respond a(k−1)
and other aspects remain the same. Because the agents are
trained with a random agent a(0) and they will “bomb out”
inevitably, we alter the reward scheme so that the agents
receive reward 0, instead of the negative of current score,
when they lose all life tokens.
The performance of CH is shown in Table 2. The most
prominent phenomenon is that CH converges quite slowly,
due to the fact that it needs to cooperate with a pool of
different yet primitive policies. For each level, we train
the models until convergence and 5 levels normally take
several days to complete. For reference, it roughly takes
less than 20 hours for SAD and our other-play agents to
reach 23 points in self-play under the same settings and
hardware. The prohibitive cost in time and computation
make CH unsuitable for complicated tasks like MARL in
Hanabi. Moreover, even though the self-play score is low,
we can already see a clear performance gap between self-
play and cross-play, making it safe to assume that CH will
not work well in zero-shot coordination.
In Table 3, we show results of K-Level method trained for
10 levels. Despite the gap between cross-play and self-
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k Cross-Play Self-Play
1 0.73 ± 0.18 0.95 ± 0.36
2 0.50 ± 0.02 0.54 ± 0.13
3 2.99 ± 0.11 3.24 ± 0.24
4 1.71 ± 0.12 2.57 ± 0.11
5 6.14 ± 0.58 7.27 ± 1.48
6 2.08 ± 0.22 4.52 ± 1.05
7 6.28 ± 0.92 8.82 ± 2.17
8 1.82 ± 0.25 4.89 ± 1.95
9 6.87 ± 0.91 10.26 ± 2.52
10 2.05 ± 0.28 6.54 ± 2.65
Table 3. K-Level Performance. We train K-Level with K = 10
and 3 seeds. The cross-play and self-play scores are computed by
intra-level pairing of agents trained with different seeds.
play being smaller, this method suffers from non-monotonic
improvements between levels and the same high cost in time
and sample complexity.
Population1 Population2
Population1 23.46 ± 0.01 19.97 ± 0.06
Population2 20.16 ± 0.06 23.44 ± 0.01
Table 4. Performance of Population Based Method. Each cell is
computed by pairing all agents from one population with those
from the other population and then average the scores. Diagonal
can be seen as self-play score and non-diagonal can be seen as
cross-play score under a population setting.
Figure 7. P (ait | ajt−1) matrices of one model from each popula-
tion. The semantic of the visualization is identical to Figure 5.
Different from CH and K-Level where agents are trained se-
quentially, population based approaches (Fitzgerald, 2019;
Tieleman et al., 2018; Lowe et al., 2019) train agents si-
multaneously by pairing distinct agents together to generate
samples. We briefly experimented with a simple population
setting where we initialize N different agents with their pri-
vate replay buffers. They are uniformly paired together with
each other to generate samples and write their observation
action sequences into the their own buffer. Each agent is
optimized independently at each training step. We train 2
populations with different seeds. Each of them contains
4 agents initialized differently. The numerical results are
shown in Table 4. This method can achieve decent cross-
play scores. It is worth noting that the diversity between the
hyper-parameters of the two populations is much smaller
than that of the experiments shown in Figure 4 so that they
are not directly comparable. However, a closer look at their
respective policy through P (ait | ajt−1) matrices reveals
the problem. The way they use color hints not only differs
greatly from each other but also breaks the color symmetry
of the game, which is the exact problem other-play tries to
solve. Qualitatively they are hard for human to play with.
They manage to achieve good cross-play scores because the
agents seldom use color hints.
